

The Scope of the Focus Particle 'Innamā in the Qur'ān

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ABSTRACT

According to traditional Arabic grammar, the particle 'innamā has two functions: it serves as an emphatic particle (*ḥarfū ta'kīd*) or as a particle of restriction (*ḥarfū ḥaṣr*) denoting "only." Our research focuses on the restrictive function of 'innamā, particularly its scope. Scholars typically explain that 'innamā is restricted to clause-initial position, while it always effects the last component in that clause. Our examination raised several findings regarding this particle: First, sentences introduced by 'innamā are often categorical statements discussing what it takes to be a believer, an unbeliever; of being God, the Devil or the Prophet. It is therefore comparatively easy to interpret and paraphrase them as conditionals or "if... then" statements. Also, these universal affirmative or negative propositions lend themselves as premises for further deductions that might be drawn from them. Second, the scope of 'innamā is versatile – it can be a noun phrase, a prepositional phrase or a verbal phrase followed by its direct object, a relative clause or a complete sentence. These distinctions are not always clear-cut; in some cases there is a choice between two possible domains or scopes, depending on the structure of the 'innamā clause. In most cases, however, the verses allow one interpretation only, which is reducible to a genuine symbolic form of modern logic notation.

INTRODUCTION

The Particle 'innamā in Grammatical Treatises

The particle 'innamā is treated by the traditional grammarians. In what follows, the explanation provided by them will be presented, however, it is interesting to see the treatment of 'innamā does not always directly elucidate the use of the particle 'innamā as a restrictive particle.

In the chapter entitled *hādā bābu 'innamā wa-'annamā*, Sībawayhi (1999: vol. 3, 129-130) says that the particle 'innamā can be placed wherever the particle 'inna is placed. However, where one of the 'af'āl al-qulūb "verbs of the heart" is involved, it must be followed by 'innamā and not by 'inna. For example, the sentence **wağadtuka 'annaka ṣāhibu kulli ḥanān* "I found you the possessor of all [that is] obscene/corrupted/wrong [in the language]" is ungrammatical, and it should be constructed as *wağadtuka 'innamā 'anta ṣāhibu kulli ḥanā* "I found you the mother of foul-mouthed language" (*lit.* I found you as the possessor of all [that is] obscene/corrupted/wrong [in the language]). The reason for using 'innamā and not 'annamā or 'anna in such cases is that when 'innamā is introduced, it indicates the beginning of a new clause functioning as the second direct object of the verb *wağadtu*, hence the sentence means literally

"I found you as the possessor of all [that is] obscene." So 'annamā and 'anna and the clause which follows them cannot be direct objects. Additionally, considering the sentence *'urā 'annahū munṭaliqu*, the clause *'annahū munṭaliqu* has the status (*manzila*) of a verbal noun, hence the sentence is incomprehensible because it means **'urā nṭilāqahu* "I think/believe his leaving." Thus the sentence should be constructed as *'urā 'innamā huwa munṭaliqu* "I believe he is leaving."

Sībawayhi also compares 'innamā to the conjunctive noun *llaḏī* because both components are followed by a conjunctive clause (*ṣila*)¹ and neither word operates as *'āmil*. Additionally, according to al-Ḥalīl 'innamā has the status of a dispensable verb (*fi'ī mulgā*) like the verb *'aṣhadu* in the sentence *'aṣhadu la-zaydun ḥayrun minka* "I witness/confirm that Zayd is better than you." The verb *'aṣhadu*, like 'innamā, does not operate as *'āmil* and simply stands at the beginning of the clause.

'innamā is usually mentioned in a discussion of *mā al-kāffā* (*lit.*) "the preventing mā." According to the traditional grammarians, this type of mā is appended to 'inna, 'anna, ka-'anna and lākinna, hindering its operation as *'āmil*.²

The particle mā which is appended to 'inna has two pos-

sible meanings, such as, for example, *'innamā ḥarrama 'alaykumu l-maytata wa-d-dama wa-laḥma l-ḥinzīri* (Q 2:173) “Verily, He has forbidden you carrion, blood, swine flesh.” If *mā* functions as *mā al-kāffa* the noun that follows it will be in the accusative, so the verse can be interpreted as “Verily, He has forbidden you only carrion, blood and swine flesh.” It can also be analyzed as a relative pronoun followed by a noun in the nominative, while the verse should be reconstructed as follows: **'inna mā ḥarramahu 'alaykumu l-maytata wa-d-dama wa-laḥma l-ḥinzīri* “What God has forbidden is carrion, blood and swine flesh” (Ibn Hišām 1991: vol. 1, 450).

While Sībawayhi refers to the grammatical characterization of *'innamā*, later grammarians elucidate the Qur'*ānic* function of *'innamā* as a restrictive particle. Some grammarians (not named by Ibn Hišām) say that *mā al-kāffa* suffixed to *'inna* is a particle of negation (*nāfiya*), and therefore *'innamā* also serves as *ḥarfū ḥaṣr* “particle of limitation/restriction.” The combination of *'inna* denoting emphasis and *mā* denoting negation can exist only in one case: where *'innamā* functions as a restrictive particle (Ibn Hišām 1991: vol. 1, 501), for example, *qul 'innamā 'ana baṣarun miṭlukum yūḥā 'ilayya 'annamā 'ilāḥukum 'ilāhun wāḥidun* (Q 18:110) “Say: I am only a mortal like you; it is revealed to me that your God is One God.”³

In conclusion, *'innamā* consists of two elements *'inna* and *mā al-kāffa*, which prevents *'inna* from causing the noun following to be in the accusative. In this case, *'innamā* can serve as an emphatic particle (*ḥarfū ta'kīd*) that can be translated as “indeed,” “verily,” or as a particle of limitation or restriction (*ḥarfū ḥaṣr*) denoting “only.” While *'innamā* stands at the beginning of the clause, the word or phrase affected by it is positioned at the end of the clause (Fischer 2002: 150).⁴ *'innamā* can also be understood as *'inna* followed by the relative *mā* (Fischer 2002: 150).⁵

This article treats the function of *'innamā* as a restrictive particle. Its counterpart in English is the particle *only*, classified by scholars as a *focus particle*. A brief definition of this term follows.

Only as a Focus Particle

In Western grammatical descriptions, *only* is classified by some scholars as an adverb of focus⁶ and by others as a particle of focus.⁷ In the clause *Only JOHN phoned* the particle *only* is a focus device used to assign prominence or stress; *John* is the part to which the prominence is assigned and the verb *phoned* is the *residue*, hence is not stressed (Taglicht 1984: 1).⁸ Focus particles have several syntactic and semantic properties. The syntactic position of the focus particles in the sentence varies, as can be seen in the following examples:

- (a) Who phoned Mary? Only John phoned Mary. (No one else phoned her.)
- (b) What was done to Mary? John only phoned Mary. (Nothing else happened to her.)
- (c) What was John doing? John only phoned Mary. (He did nothing else.)
- (d) John phoned whom? John phoned Mary only. (He didn't phone anyone else.)

These examples show that the different interpretation of the same sentence is caused by the different location of the particle *only*, which in each sentence is related to a specific component, thus is stressed or has a different phrasal/sentential scope (König 1991: 7,10,11).⁹ Introducing a focus adverb into a sentence may cause ambiguity (Hoeksema and Zwarts 1991: 57). Difference in focus will also alter the relevance of truth-values. Consider the two following sentences (1) *John only introduced Bill to Sue* (2) *John only introduced Bill to Sue*. In the first sentence “Bill” is stressed; in the second, the focal stress lies on “Sue”. This difference means that the truth-value of either sentence will differ as well. The first indicates that if John introduced anybody at all to Sue, it was Bill, therefore the truth-value of the sentence hinges on whether Bill was or was not introduced; the second alternative holds if the lady Bill was introduced to was indeed none other than Sue (Von Stechow 1991: 38).¹⁰

Objectives

The present study attempts to clarify what are the possible scopes of the focus particle *'innamā* in the Qur'*ānic* verses and how they are determined. It should be mentioned in this context that sometimes the particle *'innamā* can be interpreted by the Qur'*ānic* translators as *'inna* “verily”. It is not our goal to explain in which context the interpretation of *'innamā* as emphatic or as restrictive is motivated. We examine in this study only 52 verses in which *'innamā* is interpreted as “only” in the two translation we mentioned previously (see footnote 3).¹¹

As it was shown, in English, for example, a different location of the focus particle is responsible for difference in meaning; and the presence of *only* immediately before the focus eliminates any ambiguity. However, in Arabic the word order is irrelevant to the identification of the focal element because the particle *'innamā* has a fixed location at the beginning of the sentence; therefore, the associated focus is not always adjacent to the particle *'innamā*. So how can the scope of this particle be determined?

In section 1.1 We mentioned previously that Western scholars argue that the scope of *'innamā* is always the component that stands at the end of the sentence: “*'innamā* is an emphatic and restrictive particle “only”. While *'innamā* stands at the beginning, that which is affected by it is usually, but not always, placed at the end of the sentence for emphasis *'innamā hiya ḥarqā'u ḥamqā'u* “She is only a slovenly, stupid (woman)” (Fischer 2002, 170).

This general claim is clearly inaccurate because it does not explain why or how the limitative function of *'innamā* is related to this syntactic component. A close examination reveals that in some cases there is a choice between two possible domains or scopes of this particle. We shall show that ambiguous and unambiguous cases can be distinguished.

Since we will explain the possible focus of the particle *'innamā* in the discussed examples in terms of a natural language calculus, we would like to present the various types of this calculus in the following section.

Natura Language Calculus

Distinctions are a Qur'anic leitmotiv, a recurrent theme throughout. Rosalind Ward Gwynne (2004: 184) writes: "If the Qur'an may be called in rhetorical terms a single enormous contrast between God and his creation, in logical terms it is a single enormous disjunction between true belief and error". Natural Language calculus, developed in the first half of the twentieth century, is a metalanguage that helps us to view the workings of natural language from a distance, to see through the layer of syntactic idiosyncrasies by reformulating sentences according to rules considered commonly shared ways of human thinking. Sentence- or propositional logic is basically built up of symbols for \neg "not", $\&$ "and", \vee "or", \supset "conditional" and \Rightarrow "implication."¹²

These connectors show sentences are connected – namely, their interdependence. In sentence logic, basic units are treated as "atomic"; but widening sentence logic into predicate logic by introducing the quantifiers \forall "all" and \exists "at least one" will enable us to analyze the inner workings of atomic sentences as well. Brackets are especially important here because they mark out how strings of words can be grouped in different ways.

This will help us to reveal the structural ambiguity of certain sentences. Lexical ambiguity arises where words have different meanings; referential ambiguity is confusion about who or what is denoted by a certain predicate anyway; structural ambiguity occurs whenever strings might represent different sentences, where one sentence could have different meanings.

The so-called *Square of opposition* is the traditional baseline to explain the four standard forms of categorical propositions: A: Universal affirmative propositions (All S is P); E: Universal negative propositions (No S is P); I: Particular affirmative propositions (Some S is P); O: Particular negative propositions (Some S is not P).

Universal affirmative propositions

Universal affirmative propositions are essentially conditionals which again are made by grouping a negation \neg with an alternation \vee or combination $\&$. In natural language these implications can be phrased as "If A then B"; as "A only if B"; and even as "Only if B, A."

They might be symbolized as $(A \supset B)$; as $(\neg A \vee B)$ meaning (not A or B); and even as $\neg (A \& \neg B)$ read as "It is not the case that A and not B". These phrases and their formulae are equivalent, therefore interchangeable. Hence verse 47:19: *lā 'ilāha 'illā llāhu* "There is no God except God (Allah)" is a Universal affirmative proposition that can be paraphrased as "For all x: If god x exists, then x is Allah." Given the quality G as shorthand for EXISTS AS GOD and the quality A for BEING ALLAH, formal notation will yield $\forall x (Gx \supset Ax)$.

However, perhaps for rhetorical reasons the logically equivalent formula $\forall x (\neg Gx \vee Ax)$ read as "No God or Allah" was given preference in this verse; it means the same but sounds more strident in Arabic. Still, it would be far more circumspect but acceptable as well to formulate $\neg [\forall x$

$(Gx \& \neg Ax)]$ "It is not the case that for all x: There exists an x qualified as god and this x is not Allah."

Universal negative propositions

An example of a Universal negative proposition is verse 2:256: *lā 'ikrāha fī d-dīni* "There is no compulsion in religion." We can rephrase this into "For any x: If x is religion, then x is not compulsion," thereby making this a categorical statement of the E form. Formal notation will yield $\forall x (Rx \supset \neg Cx)$ for R: RELIGION and C: COMPULSION, or in equivalent terms $\neg \exists x (Rx \& Cx)$ "There is no x, such that x is religion and x is compulsion." Religion and compulsion belong to different spheres which never overlap.

Particular propositions

Verse 72:11: *wa-'annā minnā ṣ-ṣāliḥūna wa-minnā dūna dālika* "And there are those of us who are upright and there are those of us who are not" combines an I proposition $\exists x (Wx \& Ux)$ where W: WE and U: TO BE UPRIGHT can be interpreted as "There is at least an x that belongs to us and this x is upright" and an O proposition $\exists x (Wx \& \neg Ux)$ into $\exists x [(Wx \& Ux) \& (Wx \& \neg Ux)]$.

"Only" as Universal affirmative proposition

In most cases we found, "only" is based on a Universal affirmative proposition read in reverse. Linguistically, the reversal of an A proposition is marked by "only," "just," "simply" and other expressions. "All who believe in Allah are Muslims" then becomes "Only Muslims believe in Allah." The A proposition informs us who can count as a Muslim (a believer in Allah); its reversal informs us who is accountable as believer in Allah (only Muslims are.) The A proposition defines the inner sense of a term, its intension; its reversal outlines, the circumference of this term, its extension. So an A proposition and its reversal are two sides of the same coin, where the obverse or "heads" shows us the inner sense of a term -- its intension, and the reverse or "tails" -- the extension or value of the currency.

The famous Beach Boys song title "God Only Knows" owes its word order to a grammatical usage that is out of fashion today; but we can easily see that the difference between "Only God knows x" and "God knows only x" is profound. "Only God knows x" might be paraphrased as:

K: TO BE KNOWN

G: TO BE WITH GOD

Paraphrase: "For all x: If x is known, then x is with God."

Formula: $\forall x (Kx \supset Gx)$

This in turn is equivalent to saying:

Paraphrase: "For all x: No x is known or this x is with God."

Formula: $\forall x (\neg Kx \vee Gx)$.

In English phrases the position of "only" within the phrase or at its outer ends clearly focuses whether the objects or the predicates are subject to enquiry. The Arabic of the Qur'an puts *'innamā* ("only") always at the beginning of the phrase under consideration.

CLASSIFICATION AND ANALYSIS

During the analysis process we first looked at the distribution of 'innamā in different discourse types; those verses were classified according to their syntactic structure and content. We then discussed whether these verses allow more than one interpretation. Finally, the sentences were paraphrased and a formula was presented that aimed to be the most appropriate rendition of the meaning the original sentence intended to convey.

Actions Restricted Only to the Believers or to the Unbelievers

'innamā + verb + relative clause

A feature shared by all cases in this category is a general predication concerning the activities performed by the believers and the unbelievers. The second statement, which starts with the particle 'innamā, restricts the performance of the activity mentioned in the previous clause to those who believe.

- (1) *mā kāna li-l-mušrikīna 'an ya'muru masāğida llāhi¹³ šāhidīna 'alā 'anfusihiḥ bi-l-kufri 'ulā'ika ḥabiṭat 'a'māluhum wa-ft n-nāri hum ḥalidūna 'innamā ya'muru masāğida llāhi man 'āmana bi-llāhi wa-l-yawmi l-'āhiri wa-'aqāma ṣ-ṣalāta wa-'ātā z-zakāta wa-lam yaḥṣa 'illā llāha (Q 9:17-18)*

"It is not for the polytheists to maintain the mosques of Allah, while they bear witness to unbelief against themselves. These it is whose deeds are null, and in the Fire shall they abide forever. Only he who believes in Allah and the Last Day, and performs the prayer, and pays the alms (zakāt), and fears none but Allah, shall maintain the mosques of Allah."

Verse 18 has two potential readings:

- (a) He who believes in Allah and the Last Day, and performs the prayer, and pays the alms (zakāt), and fears none but Allah, shall only maintain the mosques of Allah."

According to this reading, the scope of the focus particle 'innamā is the verb *ya'muru* and its direct object (*masāğida llāhi*). If 'innamā would have shown a positional variability, then this reading could have been structured as: **man 'āmana bi-llāhi wa-l-yawmi l-'āhiri wa-'aqāma ṣ-ṣalāta wa-'ātā z-zakāta wa-lam yaḥṣa 'illā llāha 'innamā ya'muru masāğida llāhi (Q 9:17-18)*

- (b) Only he who believes in Allah and the Last Day, and performs the prayer, and pays the alms (zakāt), and fears none but Allah, shall maintain the mosques of Allah." According to this reading, in which the particle 'innamā takes a wide scope (the relative clause), verse 18 could have been constructed as: **'innamā man 'āmana bi-llāhi wa-l-yawmi l-'āhiri wa-'aqāma ṣ-ṣalāta wa-'ātā z-zakāta wa-lam yaḥṣa 'illā llāha ya'muru masāğida llāhi*

To determine the correct meaning in this discourse, we may use first the Wh-interrogatives test to determine the potential focused/stressed element.¹⁴ In verse 17, we are informed that it is not for the polytheists to maintain the

mosques of Allah. The question which poses itself is: Who, then, is allowed to tend the mosques of Allah?

Depending on the answer *Those who believe in Allah and the Last Day, and perform the prayer, and pay the alms (zakāt), and fear none but Allah, are allowed to enter the mosques of Allah*, the focused constituent is marked. Second, the text is ambiguous but we are guided in this case by the truth-conditional. The first reading (a) is clearly false because it asserts that *he who believes in Allah and the Last Day, and performs the prayer, and pays the alms (zakāt), and fears none but Allah, shall do nothing other than maintain the mosques of Allah*. When reading the Qur'ān, there are various commands which those who believe must fulfill,¹⁵ whereas, visiting the mosques is only one of the instructions. The second reading (b) is the correct one because it asserts that *Nobody other than he who believes in Allah and the Last Day, and performs the prayer, and pays the alms (zakāt), and fears none but Allah, shall maintain the mosques of Allah*.

Verse Q 9:17-18 shows what we call "contrastive linkage."

If we identify *mušrikīna* as the counter-concept of "believers" we may simply call them "unbelievers"; a believer simply is all and everything an unbeliever is not, and vice versa. Verse 9:17 thus simplified has the following interpretation:

B: BELIEVE

M: MAINTAIN MOSQUES

Paraphrase: "For all x: If x non-believes, then x does not maintain mosques."

Formula: $\forall x (\neg Bx \supset \neg Mx)$

Any non-believer is proscribed from maintaining a mosque (whether he is unable to do so or just not allowed is a question soon to be discussed). From this, we can infer a so-called Contraposition, logically equivalent to $\forall x (\neg Bx \supset \neg Mx)$; terms have changed their positions, negations are negated themselves by "negatio duplex affirmat":

B: BELIEVE

M: MAINTAIN MOSQUES

Paraphrase: "For all x: If x maintains mosques, then x believes."

Formula: $\forall x (Mx \supset Bx)$

Now we might wonder whether maintaining a mosque is only possible for believers. Cannot unbelievers also maintain them? The conditional $\forall x (Mx \supset Bx)$ tells us that they cannot; if we read $\forall x (\neg Mx \vee Bx)$ we see that someone does not maintain mosques or he is a believer. So if he does indeed maintain them, he in fact must be a believer. There might be other ways of proving your faith but maintaining a mosque is a sufficient condition for being a believer; this is just one of many ways to prove it. The conditional stated as $\neg [\forall x (Mx \& \neg Bx)]$ "It is not the case that for all x: There is an x that maintains mosques and this x is not a believer" reminds us that it is impossible to maintain a mosque and be a non-believer at the same time; by maintaining mosques, we prove that we are part of the wider group of believers. As an Euler Diagram shows, the group of maintainers is wholly contained within the superset of believers: it is a smaller circle within a wider one. So a maintainer is necessarily a believer by definition.

A conditional is made up of two terms; the first term might be called *protasis*, *hypothesis* or *antecedent*; the other term might be called *apodosis*, *thesis* or *consequent*; the focus particle indicates the direction of dependence of the two terms, how the content of one term is expounded upon by the other. Any textbook on logic stresses that conditionals are purely formal relations. Their content might often seem rather far-fetched, but once we establish a connection – e.g., between belief and maintaining mosques – the consequences are inescapable.

Another example is:

- (2) *lā yasta 'dīnuka llaḏīna yu 'minūna bi-llāhi wa-l-yawmi l-'āḥiri 'an yuḡāhidū bi-'amwālihim wa-'anfusihihim wa-llāhu 'alīmun bi-l-muttaqīna 'innamā yasta 'dīnuka llaḏīna lā yu 'minūna bi-llāhi wa-l-yawmi l-'āḥiri wa-rtābat qulūbuhum fa-hum fī raybihihim yataraddadūna* (Q 9:44-45)

“Those who believe in Allah and the Last Day do not ask you for exemption from fighting on the path of Allah with their wealth and lives. Allah is All-Knowing of the pious ones. Only those who do not believe in Allah and the Last Day ask exemption for you, and their hearts are in doubt, so they waver in their doubt.”

According to Rāzī (2000: vol. 15, 61-62), verses 44 to 45 were revealed after the Battle of Tabūk in order to distinguish the believers from the hypocrites, who had come to the Prophet for his permission to stay at home. The believers, on the other hand, never made excuses and always went to war without any hesitation. Only those who were weak in their belief, were hypocrites, and had no faith in Allah and the Resurrection Day, argued over the question of the Holy Struggle.

The focus particle *'innamā* underlines the contrast between the believers and the hypocrites. If the listener is informed that those who believe in Allah and the Last Day do not ask God for exemption from fighting, then the question is who does ask? The only true proposition is: *Only those who do not believe in Allah and the Last Day ask exemption from you*. It asserts that no other than the unbelievers/hypocrites will ask God to be excused from fighting in God's way. Reading verse 45 as *those who do not believe in Allah and the Last Day only ask exemption from you* asserts that the only action performed by the unbelievers is asking for exemption from fighting in the way of Allah. However, since the unbelievers perform other actions¹⁶ this proposition does not hold, therefore the second reading, in which the verb is focused, has no true value. This argument can be formulated as follows: We read verse 9:45 as “Only those ask, who do not believe.” Turned into the obverse it might be read “For every x: If x does not believe, then x asks.”

B: BELIEVE

A: ASK FOR EXEMPTION

Paraphrase: “For all x: If x does not believe, then x asks.”

Formula: $\forall x (\neg Bx \supset Ax)$

This step allows us to infer the Contraposition of verse 9:45, which is already expressed in verse 9:44:

Paraphrase: “For all x: If x does not ask, he believes.”

Formula: $\forall x (\neg Ax \supset Bx)$

So once again, a conditional and its contraposition are used to stress an antithesis: true faith and vacillation are mutually exclusive.

In examples one and two there are two parallel–antithetical verses. In the next example this structure is not exhibited, however the content of the verses preceding the sentence starting with *'innamā* stands in contrast to it:

- (3) *'innamā yu 'minu bi-'āyātīna llaḏīna 'idā ḏukkirū bihā ḥarrū suḡḡadan wa-sabbahū bi-ḥamdī rabbihihim wa-hum lā yastakbirūna* (Q 32:15)

“Only those who, when they are reminded of our signs, fall down prostrating in obeisance and celebrate the praise of their Lord, and they are not proud and they believe in our signs.”

In Q 32 verses 4-9 God All-Mighty is described. It is he who created the heavens and the earth and what is between them. He directs the affairs of this world from heaven down to earth. Yet in verses 9-14 we read that despite the power of the Almighty, people still have doubts. Asking: When we are lost in the earth (i.e. when we will become dust), shall we even then be (returned) into a new creation? The disbelief of the people is also illustrated in verse 12, where the unbelievers say to God: We have seen and we have heard (what You had promised), therefore send us back (to the world) so we could do righteousness. Thus, after illustrating the features of the wrong-doers, verses 12-17 refer to some outstanding qualities of the true believers. The transition from the unbelievers to the believers is marked by the application of the particle *'innamā*. As in examples one and two, the focus scope is also the relative clause, where there is only one true-condition: *only the believers and no other than them believe in God's signs*. If *'innamā* takes VP scope (i.e. *yu 'minu bi-'āyātīna*), the resultant reading *the believers do nothing other than believe in God's sign* would be false because as it was mentioned previously that the believers perform various actions. This explanation can be concluded by the following formula:

B: BELIEVE

P: PROSTRATE

Paraphrase: “For all x: If x believes, then x prostrates.”

Formula: $\forall x (Bx \supset Px)$

'innamā + definite noun + relative clause

In this group *'innamā* functions as a restrictive particle while still retaining an emphatic connotation. The main distinction between this group and the foregoing is the lack of any contrast between the two issues addressed.

- (4) *'innamā t-tawbatu 'alā llāhi li-llaḏīna ya 'malūna s-sū'a bi-ḡahālatin tumma yatūbūna min qarībin fa-'ulā'ika yatūbu llāhu 'alayhim* (Q 4:17)

“Repentance with Allah is only for those who do evil out of ignorance and then repent soon. So these are they to whom Allah returns (mercifully) and Allah is All-Knowing, All-Wise.”

In verse Q 4:16 repentance is always an option, as it is stated that when the women are guilty of lewdness, their husbands should call to witness four of them (Muslims) against these wives; then if they testify, the husbands shall detain the wives in the houses until death takes them away or Allah makes some way for them. However, when two of the wives

commit lewdness they should be punished, but if they repent and amend, then the husband should turn aside from them.

Verse 4:17 adds that only those who do evil out of ignorance and repent immediately afterwards can expect forgiveness. This restriction is further strengthened by verse 18, which states that repentance will not save those who do evil deeds until death, then finally say: now I repent.

If 'innamā in Q 4:17 would have interacted with another *foci*, namely with both the NP *at-tawbatu* and the PP 'alā llāhi, then the meaning of the sentence would have been clearly different, stating that *those who do evil ignorantly and then repent will only achieve repentance with Allah and nothing else other than that*. However, this statement becomes false when we consider, for example, Q 25:69-70, where it is stated that on Judgment Day the chastisement will be doubled to the unbelievers. If they will repent, however, believe and do righteous deeds, Allah will not only accept their repentance but He will also change their evil deeds into good deeds.

The following conditional shows us how the consequent "being misled" is the necessary prerequisite for the antecedent "to repent"; remorse and repentance depend on the insight of having been led astray, of erring in our ways of striving for a goal which in itself is honorable:

R: REPENT

M: MISLED

Paraphrase: "For all x: If x repents, then x has been misled."

Formula: $\forall x (Rx \supset Mx)$

In Q 4:17 verses 15, 16 and 17 are linked lexically by the repetition of words and verbs derived from the root of *twb* (*tābā*, *tawwāb*, *tawba*, *yatūbūna*, *tawba*, *tubtu*). Since the lexeme *repentance* is already presupposed and can be regarded as *old information*, the focus of 'innamā must indicate *new information*.¹⁷ This new information is provided by Universal affirmative propositions (all S is P); they allow Analytical judgments, laying bare in P what is hidden in S.

A similar example is:

(5) 'innamā l-mu'minūna llaḏīna 'idā ḏukira llāhu waḡilat qulūbuhum wa-'idā tuliyaṭ 'alayhim 'āyātuhu zādathum 'īmānan wa-'alā rabbiḥim yatawakkalūna (Q 8:2).¹⁸

"Only the believers are those whose hearts quake when Allah is mentioned, and when His Signs are recited to them they increase in faith, and they trust in their Lord (alone)."

In Q 8:1 it is stated that the people ask Muḥammad about the spoils. He answers that the spoils belong to Allah and the Messenger; so the people should be in awe of Allah, and set aright the relations between themselves, and obey Allah and His Messenger if they do believe ('in kuntum mu'minīna). Q 8:2 is thematically related to the previous verse not only lexically (i.e. by the appearance of the word *mu'minīna*), but it concerns the essence of belief emphasizing that true believers are only those who manifest specific rites. Semantically, there is only one relevant interpretation of Q 8:2, which is *Only the true believers are those who, when Allah's name is mentioned, their hearts quake, and when His verses are recited to them their faith grows, and who put their trust in their Lord*. In this case, there is no need of certain tests for determining that the potential *foci* of this sentence is the

believers (*al-mu'minīna*). If the *foci* would have been the relative clause, then it would have been asserted that the believers are defined by three actions only: when Allah is mentioned, their hearts quake; when His Signs are recited to them, it increases them in faith; and in their Lord (alone) do they trust. However, when reading Q 8:3-4 such a statement becomes false, since additional rites which must be manifested by the believers are mentioned: *Believers are those who establish prayer and spend in charity and benevolently out of what Allah has given them as their sustenance*. Q 8:1-4 shows that faith is the ability to confirm and submit to the command of God and that faith is not static and reduced to only a few acts which have the same quality.

B: TO BELIEVE

A: TO BE REMEMBERED OF ALLAH

H: TO HAVE A QUIVERING HEART

R: TO HEAR RECITALS

F: TO BE FAITHFUL

T: TO TRUST

Formula: $\forall x [Bx \supset ((Ax \supset Hx) \& (Rx \supset Fx) \& Tx)]$

This whole formula is just an enumeration of conditions that must be met in full for one to count as a believer; he who will meet al. of them is a believer.

'innamā in conditional clauses

Several verses remind us that man is in a certain predicament; he cannot escape the results of his actions, whatever he does:

(6) *qul yā-'ayyuhā n-nāsu qad ḡā'akumu l-ḥaqqu min rab-bikum fa-mani ḥtadā fa-'innamā yaḥtadī li-naḡsihi wa-man ḏalla fa-'innamā yaḏillu 'alayhā* (Q 10:108).¹⁹

"It should be O people! the Truth has come to you from your Lord. Therefore, whomever is guided, he is guided only to his own advantage, and whoever strays, he strays only to his disadvantage; and I am not a warden over you."

The Prophet's duty is only to bring God's message to the people, so it is up to them whether or not they accept it, but Q 11:108 affirms that whatever we do, we do it to ourselves. In Q 4:110-112 three transgression against the Divine law and their consequences are mentioned: First, whoever does evil or acts unjustly to himself then seeks forgiveness of Allah, shall find Allah Forgiving, Merciful (verse 10); The second path is mentioned above in Q 4:111; Third, whoever commits a fault or a sin, then accuses an innocent of it, he indeed burdens (himself) with the calumny and a manifest sin.

These three verses teach that injustice towards people affects only those who commit it and no one else.

"To be guided towards" is an example of a Binary relation: some x is guided toward some y. To explain the concept of Binary relations, the example most often found on the Internet is "x loves y." Person x might love person y L(x,y), might be loved by y L(y,x), or might love himself L(x,x). If he only loves himself, all persons y he might ever love are identical to himself only. Binary relations can also contrast Oneness against the Infinite. According to Anselm of Canterbury, God is "a being than which none greater can be conceived." If we write Gxy: "x can be thought of as greater than y," and g: God, we derive the formula: $\forall x (\neg Ggx)$

(Schamberger and Hardy 2018: 176). This bears a striking resemblance to “Allāhu akbar,” where Gxy : “x is greater than y” and g : God combine to form $\forall y (Ggy)$.

G: GUIDED

Paraphrase: “For all y: If x is guided toward y, then x is identical to y.”

Formula: $\forall y (G(x,y) \supset x = y)$

If we understand *yaḍillu* as the exact counter-concept of *yahtadī*, we can shorten it to $\neg G$, formulating the latter part of verse 10:108 in just the same way as $\forall y (\neg G(x,y) \supset x = y)$.

(7) *wa-man yaksib 'iṭman fa-'innamā yaksibuhū 'alā nafsīhi wa-kāna llāhu 'alīman ḥakīman* (Q 4:111)

“And whoever commits a sin, he commits it only against his own self and Allah is All-Knowing, All-Wise.”

S: TO SIN AGAINST

Paraphrase: “For all y: If x sins against y, then x is identical to y.”

Formula: $\forall y (S(x,y) \supset x = y)$

(8) *wa-man ḡāhada fa-'innamā yuḡāhidu li-nafsīhi 'inna llāha la-ḡaniyyun 'ani l-'ālamīna* (Q 29:6)

“And whoever strives hard, he strives only for his own self, verily Allah is self-sufficient, above (need of) the Worlds.”

S: TO STRIVE

Paraphrase: “For all y: If x strives for y, then x is identical to y.”

Formula: $\forall y (S(x,y) \supset x = y)$

According to Ṭabarī (1992: vol. 10, 122-123), it is stated in Q 29:6 that whoever struggles against his enemies struggles only against his own self because by doing so he ultimately strives for God’s mercy. The verb already presupposed may be regarded as the *residue*, while the part which is made prominent by the focus particle *'innamā* is the prepositional phrase (*li-nafsīhi*, *'alayhā*, *'alā nafsīhi*, *li-nafsīhi*). Thus, the identification of the prominent component in the sentence is associated not only with true-conditional but also with the information structure. Namely, if a specific component was already mentioned previously, then the focal stress lies only on the so-called *new information* which is positioned in all examined cases at the end of the clause.

Descriptions of God All-Mighty

The image of God in the Qur’ān is described in a variety of statements, each having its unique features. The clauses starting with the focus particle *'innamā* assert God’s hegemony over others. God is the master of Judgment day, He is the only ally and only He will bring the Signs.

'innamā followed by a verb or a noun followed by the noun Allah

(9) *qāla 'innamā ya'tikum bihi llāhu 'in šā'a wa-mā 'antum bi-mu'ḡizīna* (11:33)

“He said: Only Allah will bring it to you, if He wills, and you will not be able to frustrate (it).”

In 11:32 the people are addressing Noah, asking him to bring them what he had promised, namely divine punishment.²⁰ Noah replies that the punishment for their behavior

is not his doing but depends upon the will of Allah only, so no human can do anything to prevent it.

We propose the following interpretation: “Allah will bring x only if Allah wants x.”

B: BROUGHT BY ALLAH

W: WANTED BY ALLAH

Paraphrase: “For all x: If x is brought by Allah, then x is wanted by Allah.”

Formula: $\forall y (Bx \supset Wx)$

(10) *'innamā waliyyukum llāhu wa-rasūluhū* (Q 5:55)

“Only Allah and His Messenger are your allies.”

Q 5:55 concludes this thematic section by forbidding any relation with the Muslims’ opponents: Jews and Christians (mentioned in verse 51), those who have hesitation and doubts regarding God (mentioned in verse 52), and those who have turned away from Islam (mentioned in verse 54). Verse 55 states that the alliance is due to God and His Messenger only:

Y: TO BE ALLIED

A: TO BE WITH ALLAH

M: TO BE WITH A MESSENGER

Paraphrase: “For all x: If x has an ally, then x is with Allah or Allah’s messenger or both.”

Formula: $\forall x (Yx \supset (Ax \vee Mx))$

The symbol \vee for “logical disjunction” or alternation, derived from Latin “vel,” tells us that the consequent would only be false if neither Allah nor his messenger were allies. Wright (1971: Vol. I, p. 109 § 194(a) and p. 148 § 247(b)) translates *ism al-wahdati* as “Nomen unitatis vel individualitatis,” and also *'asmā' al-kaṭrati* as “Nomina Abundantiae vel Multitudinis,” to indicate in each case the non-exclusivity of the two meanings; they even might both be true.

(11) *qul 'innamā l-'āyātu 'inda llāhi wa-mā yuṣ'irukum 'annahā 'iḏā ḡā'at lā yu'minūna* (Q 6:109)

“Say: Signs are only with Allah. And what should make you know that when they come they will not believe?”

Q 6:109 refers to a group of unbelievers who asked the Prophet to show miracles so that they might believe in God. The Messenger replied that miracles are only worked by God, not according to wishes of men:

S: TO BE A SIGN

A: TO BE WITH ALLAH

Paraphrase: “For all x: If x is a sign, then x is with Allah.”

Formula: $\forall x (Sx \supset Ax)$

(12) *yas'alūnaka 'ani s-sā'ati 'ayyāna mursāhā qul 'innamā 'ilmuhā 'inda rabbī yuḡallihā li-waqtihā 'illā huwa* (Q 7:187)²¹

“They ask you about the Hour (of Resurrection) when it will set in. Say: Its knowledge is only with my Lord. None but He can manifest it at its time.”

According to Rāzī (2000: vol. 15, 67), the Jews or the infidels of Qurayš had asked Muḥammad about the time of Resurrection. His answer was that nobody except Allah could know when it would occur.

K: TO HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE HOUR

A: TO BE WITH ALLAH

Paraphrase: “For all x: If x is knowledge of the Hour, then x is with Allah.”

Formula: $\forall x (Kx \supset Ax)$

To conclude this section, 'innamā retains its restrictive function. The examined clauses starting with 'innamā are not ambiguous, having only a single syntactic-semantic focus. This is for two reasons: first, in most of the examined verses there is a lexical linkage between two sentences: that which begins with 'innamā and that which precedes it.

For example, in Q 5:55 the word 'awliyā' "allies" (plural form of waliyy) appears in Q 5:51: *yā-ʿayyuhā llaḏīna ʿamanū lā tattahīdū l-yahūda wa-n-naṣārā ʿawliyāʿa* "O you who have Faith! Do not take the Jews and the Christians for allies." In Q 7:187 a referential link is achieved by the anaphoric pronoun -hā in 'ilmuhā which refers to the lexeme *as-sāʿati*. The repetition of the lexemes is relevant for the identification of the focal element because in such cases 'innamā highlights only the new information in the utterance.

Secondly, theoretically the sentences are open to more than one interpretation. For example, in Q 6:109 both the NP and the PP can be stressed, therefore the resultant readings are:

- (a) The signs are only with Allah.
- (b) Only the signs are with Allah.

- (a) if x are signs, then x are with Allah
- (b) if x are with Allah, then x are signs

- (a) $\forall x (Sx \supset Ax)$
- (b) $\forall x (Ax \supset Sx)$

Both sentences state that the signs are with Allah, but while (a) asserts that no one other than God manifests the signs (b) asserts that God has only the signs and nothing else. Of course this notion is false because we know from other verses that God is all-encompassing.

'innamā followed by a verb

The focus particle 'innamā in the following case is directly adjacent to its focus expression, the verb.

(13) *'innamā ḥarrama ʿalaykumu l-maytata wa-d-dama wa-laḥma l-ḥinzīri wa-mā ʿuhilla bihi li-ḡayri llāhi* (Q 2:173)²²

"He has forbidden you only carrion, blood, swine flesh, and whatever has had another (name) than Allah's invoked upon it."²³

In Q 2:172 it is stated: "O you who have Faith! eat of the good things We have provided you with, and be grateful to Allah, if Him it is you worship." According to this verse certain edible things are lawful to eat, but in verse 173 we read that there are some excluded things and Allah has forbidden the people carrion, blood, swine flesh or the flesh of any animal slaughtered. However, in cases of emergency, the things forbidden under normal conditions may be permissible.

In this case there is a general statement concerning food. In the sentence containing 'innamā, 'innamā is followed by a syntagm X (*l-maytata wa-d-dama wa-laḥma l-ḥinzīri wa-mā ʿuhilla bihi li-ḡayri llāhi*), which might have been a possible member of y (*ṭayyibāti mā razaqnākum* "the good things we have provided you"), but of which the membership is then explicitly excluded.

To convey the idea that carrion, blood or swine flesh are prohibited -- not all items bundled together but each and ev-

ery one of them, the formalization uses a \vee "or" instead of $\&$ "and." So the formula ($\neg A \vee B$) in full is (\neg forbidden \vee (carrion \vee blood \vee swine)): "Nothing is forbidden unless it is carrion or blood or swine."

Descriptions of the Prophet's Actions

In the clauses categorized in this section 'innamā is followed by a verb and a relative clause as its direct object. We wish to develop the hypothesis that in such structures the focus particle can have different semantic scopes, but this does not necessarily mean that the semantics changes accordingly. In example 14 we read that some of the unbelievers asked the prophet why he himself had not worked a miracle and brought it to the people.²⁴ He replied:

(14) *wa-ʿiḏā lam taʿtihim bi-ʿāyatīn qālū law-lā ḡtabaytahā qul ʿinnamā ʿattabiʿu mā yuḥā ʿilayya min rabbi* (Q 7:203)

"And when you do not bring them a sign, they say: 'Why do you not choose one? Say: I follow only what is revealed to me from my Lord.'"

The sentence starting with 'innamā might be interpreted as follows:

- (a) The prophet follows only what is revealed to him from his Lord and he does not follow anything else.
- (a) "For all x: If the prophet follows x, then x is revealed by Allah."

- (a) $\forall x (Px \supset Ax)$

According to this interpretation the stressed component is the relative clause *mā yuḥā ʿilayya min rabbi*.

- (b) The prophet only follows what is revealed to him from his Lord and he takes no other action.
- (b) "For all x: If x is revealed by Allah, then the prophet follows x."

- (b) $\forall x (Ax \supset Px)$

In this case the focus scope is the verb and its direct object (the relative clause).

An additional example is

(15) *wa-lā tazīru wāziratun wizra ʿuḥrā wa-ʿin tadʿu mutqalātun ʿilā ḥimlihā lā yuḥmal minhu ṣayʿun wa-law kāna ḏā qurbā ʿinnamā tundīru llaḏīna yaḥṣawna rabbahum bi-l-ḡaybi wa-ʿaqāmū ṣ-ṣalāta* (Q 35:18)²⁵

"And no one laden bears the burden of another; and if one heavy-burdened calls for his load to be carried, not a thing of it will be carried, even if he be a near kinsman. You warn only those who fear their Lord in secret and keep up prayer."

With *llaḏīna yaḥṣawna rabbahum bi-l-ḡaybi* as focus, it means that the prophet warns only those who fear their Lord in secret and keep up prayer. He does not warn anybody else. However, if the scope of the focus particle is the complete clause (i.e., including both the verb and its direct object *tundīru llaḏīna yaḥṣawna rabbahum bi-l-ḡaybi*) two meanings are possible:

- (a) The prophet only warns those who fear their Lord in secret and maintain prayer. He takes no other action. True, one of the prophet's roles is to warn the people of Judgment day; however, in the Qur'ān he is also addressed among other things as announcer (*baṣīr*) and warner (Q 2:119), as witness (*ṣāhid*) and bearer of good tidings

(*mubaššir*) (Q 33:45).

- (b) The prophet only warns those who fear their Lord in secret and maintain prayer. He does not warn those who doubt and perform no ritual. This meaning is similar to the case where the relative clause (not including the verb *tundīru*) is focused and indicates that *the prophet warns only those who fear their Lord in secret and maintain prayer*. Therefore, we may establish the following rule: When *'innamā* is immediately followed by a verb and its direct object, its scope can be either the verb and its direct object or only the direct object. Both possibilities yield the same meaning.²⁶

(16) *fa-'in hāggūka fa-qul 'aslamtu wağhiya li-llāhi wa-māni ttaba'ani wa-qul li-llađīna 'ūtū l-kitāba wa-l-'ummiyyīna 'a-'aslamtum fa-'in 'aslamū fa-qadi htadaw wa-'in tawallaw fa-'innamā 'alayka l-balāgu wa-llāhu bašīrun bi-l-'ibādi* (Q 3:20)²⁷

“So if they dispute with you, say: I have submitted myself (totally) to Allah, and whoever follows me. And say to those who have been given the Book and the unlettered ones: ‘Do you (also) submit yourselves?’ So if they submit then indeed they are rightly guided, and if they turn back, then upon you is only the delivery of the message, and Allah is well aware of the servants.”

In Q 3:20 there are two phrases that can be focused by the particle *'innamā*. When the prepositional phrase is focused (*'alayka*), then it is meant that if the people turn back, then only upon you is delivery. As it seems, this reading does not make any sense, because the relation between the clauses is unclear. However, when the noun phrase (*al-balāgu*) is focused the clause means that if they turn back, then upon you is only the delivery. Namely, if the people refrain and do not accept Islam, there will be no harm to the prophet because he is the Messenger of Allah and his duty is only to convey the Message and to attract their attention to the way of right and guidance. His duty is not to impose his message in any case.

O: TO BE AN OBLIGATION

W: TO DELIVER A WARNING

Paraphrase: “For all x: If x is an obligation, then x is to deliver a warning.”

Formula: $\forall x (Ox \supset Wx)$

Description of the Devil's Actions

The Qur'ān describes the Devil as a creature full of guile who leads the people astray. We would pay particular attention to Q 3:155. This verse is about the people who escaped from the Battle of 'Uḥud. The defeat on that day was caused by the Devil who had misled the believers.²⁸

(17) *'inna llađīna tawallaw minkum yawma ltaqā l-ğam'āni 'innamā stazallahumu š-šayṭānu bi-ba'đi mā kasabū* (Q 3:155)

“Verily those of you who turned back on the day (of 'Uḥud) when the two troops met, only Satan made them slip because of something they earned.”

There are two possible representations for Q 3:155:

- (a) With *š-šayṭānu* as focus it is meant that it was only Satan who made them slip and no one else.

M: TO SLIP

S: TO BE A SATAN

Paraphrase: “For all x: If x made them slip, then x was Satan.”

Formula: $\forall x (Mx \supset Sx)$

- (b) With *stazallahum* as focus it is meant that on that day Satan only made them slip. He did not take any other action. Alternately, on that day Satan only made them slip. He did not encourage the people to fight. This interpretation results if we consider *bi-ba'đi* as a Premise indicator. A premise indicator is an expression such as “for,” “since” and “because” which connects two statements, signifying that the one that immediately follows the indicator is in fact a premise from which the other is inferred as a conclusion; what follows “because” justifies what went before it. Thus *bi-ba'đi mā kasabū* is a premise, forming part of an argument, in this case a *Modus ponens*:

A: “They earned x.”

$A \supset B$: “If they earned x, then Satan made them slip for x.”

$\Rightarrow B$: Therefore: “Satan made them slip for x.”

Formula: $A \supset B, A \Rightarrow B$

The first sentence asks an extensional question: who made them slip? The second sentence seeks to answer an intensional question: what caused the slip?

These representations are not only satisfactory from the point of view of common-sense, but they are also true. In the first reading (a) it is presupposed that something or someone made the people slip; the question is who did it? By focusing the word *š-šayṭānu*, the Devil is indicated as the agent. In the second reading (b) it is proposed that the Devil attended on the Battle of 'Uḥud; now the question is what has he done there?

Furthermore, one reading does not contradict the other, namely in the previous cases it was shown that the sentence can have a true value only if the other sentence does not hold. However, in Q 3:155 the first reading is true and the second reading also holds. So, how can that be explained? Usually, the context helped us in determining what is true and what is false, yet Q 3:155 speaks about a specific event that took place in the past, where there is no evidence that the Devil on that day took actions other than making the people slip; therefore, interpreting Q 3:155 as the Satan only made them slip on that day is also acceptable.

The classic *Modus ponens* is verse 2:24: *fa-'in lam taf'alū wa-lan taf'alū fa-ttaqū n-nāra llatī waqūduhā n-nās-u wa-l-ḥiğārat-u 'u 'iddat li-l-kāfirīna*: “If they don't do x, they will meet the fire. They don't do x. Therefore, they will meet the fire.” A mere fragment of *Modus ponens* is verse 4:82: *'a-fa-lā yaddabbarūna l-qur'āna wa-law kāna min 'indi ġayri llāhi la-wağadū fīhi ḥtilāfan kaṭīran*: “Do they not, then, ponder over the Qur'ān? Had it been from someone other than Allah, they would have found in it many inconsistencies.” Completely spelled out, it would run thus: “If x is not from Allah, then they will find contradictions in x. They will not find contradictions in x. Therefore, x is from Allah.”

We might be tempted to assert that there are indeed contradictions in the Qur'ān, but this would not disprove the claim that *x* was not from Allah; so-called Affirming the consequent is a common fallacy. Still, two other points deserve attention. First, the opponent in the debate might apply *Modus ponens*, reading the verse “If *x* is not from Allah, then they will find contradictions in *x*. This *x* is not from Allah, therefore we find contradictions in *x*.” The opponent could doubt the authenticity of the Qur'ān and still count as a believer; the burden of factual proof would remain with the prophet. Secondly, if the original conditional is put into Contraposition: “If they won't find contradictions in *x*, then *x* is from Allah,” the empty formality of conditionals as such stands in the open; common sense tells us that not finding contradictions will not mean that there aren't any.

In the last two sections 2.3 and 2.4 'innamā function as a restrictive particle. A feature that is shared by all verses in these two groups is that they are preceded by a statement which concerns the prophet or the devil. The clause with 'innamā introduces a statement that qualifies them, and additionally it clarifies the relation between the clauses. In Q 7:203 (example 14) the unbelievers ask the prophet why he did not choose by himself one of the signs? The reason is explained by the clause: I follow only what is revealed to me from my Lord. In Q 35:18 (example 15), it is explained that in the Hereafter the burden of everybody is on their own shoulders and it does not harm others. The clause following 'innamā explains that this warning can be only understood and accepted by the believers. And in Q 3:155 (example 17) the turning back of the people was caused by the Satan. Namely, 'innamā implies a cause-and-effect relation.

CONCLUSION

'innamā in the Qur'ān serves as a focus particle which can be translated as “only.” Clauses including 'innamā are used in discourses where the quality of being a believer, an unbeliever, God, Devil or Prophet is elaborated. Believers are only those who, when reminded of God's signs, will fall down (example 3); who, in committing a sin, only do so against themselves (example 7); only God knows when Judgment Day will occur (example 11) and the prophet follows only what is revealed to him (example 14). These are categorical statements, either Universal affirmative propositions or Universal negative propositions.

The main issue, which was discussed in this study, was the part that is focused by 'innamā. Traditional grammarians and Western scholars agree that the component affected by the focus particle 'innamā is always positioned at the end of the clause, as in *qāla 'innamā ya'tikum bihi llāhu* (Q 11:33) “He said: Only Allah will bring it to you” (see example 9), where the NP Allah is focused. However, this is overly general therefore inaccurate assumptions probably derive from the fact that no attention is paid to prominent conceptions in research on focus particles such as *focus*, *scope* and *ambiguity*, and no attempt was made to define exactly which components are affected. Is it the final word, the final phrase or the final clause?

Thus, three findings should be highlighted: First, the scope of 'innamā can be NP, VP, PP or VP followed by its di-

rect object, a relative clause or a complete sentence. Second, logically, only one interpretation of the sentence preceded by 'innamā can be accepted because any other interpretation would be false. For example, in verses referring to the believers, as in Q (9:17-18) the scope of 'innamā is the subject, i.e., the relative clause. If the verb would have been focused it would have indicated that the believers are required to perform only one action, to maintain the mosques of Allah. Such a statement is false. Alternately, if we consider example 2, 'innamā *yasta'dīnuka lladīna lā yu'minūna bi-llāhi wa-l-yawmi l-'āhiri* (Q 9:44-45) “Only those who do not believe in Allah and the Last Day ask exemption for you,” it would be false to interpret this clause as “those who do not believe in Allah and the Last Day only ask exemption for you.” The true meaning of an 'innamā-clause is context-dependent.

Third, it is not the position of the focused component that helps us determine the *foci*; rather, there are strict factors which affect the interaction between the focus particle and the focused part:

- (a) If one of the syntactic constituents stated in the 'innamā-clause has been mentioned before, then the focused part is the new information. In example 1 (Q 9:17-19) the verb *ya'muru* and its object occurs twice: in verse 17 (*mā kāna li-l-mušrikīna 'an ya'muru masāğida llāhi*) and in verse 18 (*'innamā ya'muru masāğida llāhi man 'āmana bi-llāhi*). Since this verb is regarded as old information, the relative clause which is stressed by the particle 'innamā is regarded as the new information. Or in example 8 there are two verbs derived from the root *ğhd*: *wa-man ġāhada fa-'innamā yuğāhidu li-nafsihi* (Q 29:6). The scope of 'innamā in this case is the PP and not the already knew VP.
- (b) In verses referring to the prophet's actions or to the devil's actions, there are two optional scopal reach. When the 'innamā-clause is structured by VP and there is a direct object/indirect object, the focus scope can be either the direct object or the VP and its direct/indirect object because they yield the same meaning.

END NOTES

1. Here the term *šila* means that the clause is connected to *lladī* or to the particle 'innamā to complete their meaning. For the term *šila* in relative clauses, see Dror (2016), 75-76.
2. See, for example, 'Astarābādī (1998), vol. 4, 475; Nöldeke (1963), 59.
3. The translation of the Qur'ānic verses is based on the translations provided by *Islam.org* and by Khoury (1998). The few changes which are made usually concern the position of *only* in the sentence.
4. Cf. Wright (1971: third part, 81, 335); Sinnū et al. (2010, vol. 1, 1377).
5. Cf. Zarkašī (1958: vol. 3, 76); Sāmarrā'ī (2000: vol. 1, 327-328); Sinnū, et al., (2010: vol. 1, 1377).
6. See, for example, Nevalainen (1987); Hoeksema and Zwarts (1991).
7. See, for example, König (1991); Ippolito (2007); Crnić (2012).

8. Cf. Nevalainen (1987: 142); Von Stechow (1991: 37).
9. Cf. Mosegaard Maj-Britt (1998: 47); Hoeksema and Zwarts (1991: 51-54).
10. Cf. Rooth (1985: 1-3); Rooth (1997: 271-272).
11. *'innamā* is not only translated as “verily” or “only”. In some cases it is translated also as “just” or “merely”, i.e., it functions as an interpersonal particle. According to Taglicht (1984: 7), all focusing devices including *only* give prominence to a specific part in the utterance, and this itself is part of their meaning. However, for each focusing device this prominence is associated with some other aspects of meaning, namely the interpersonal component, which is concerned with expressing the speaker’s perspective, his motive for speaking. For example, *just* is favored in speech where it is oriented to the participants’ involvement in the speech as a subjective or interpersonal modal particle. In the sentence *I’m just torn between the thought (...) just* is emphatic, whereas in the sentence *this is just a journey one does by oneself* the particle *just* is used for downtoning (Aijmer 2002: 153-154). Thus, cases such as *qul 'innamā 'ana bašarun miḥlukum yūhā 'ilayya 'annamā 'ilāhukum 'ilāhun wāḥidun* (Q 18:110) “Say: ‘I am only/just a mortal like you. It is revealed unto me that your God is the only God’” were not examined in this study.
12. The surface form of these symbols varies due to lack of standards for them: \supset is often written as \rightarrow , & as \wedge , but they mean the same. Note that “Material conditional” and “Logical consequence,” the latter also called “entailment,” as different concepts should be represented by different symbols.
13. According to the Qur’ānic exegesis, the word *masāğid* (plural form) can be read as *masğid* (singular form) denoting *al-masğid al-ḥarām* “the Sacred Mosque”, “the Great Mosque of Mecca.” See, for example. Zamaḥšarī (1947: vol. 2, 253-255).
14. See: König (1991), 11.
15. See, for example: Q 4:43; 4:59; 5:8; 8:24; 22:77.
16. See, for example: Q 6:15; 9:29; 16:104; 36:7.
17. For the division between old and new information, see Rooth (1985), 10 and Nevalainen (1987), 143.
18. Additional examples are Q 49:15; 24:62. In this context, Q 36:10-11 and Q 72:20 should be mentioned. Both verses describe the prophet’s actions, where the verb placed immediately after *'innamā* is already mentioned in the previous clause.
19. Additional examples are Q 3:178; 20:72; 34:50; 39:41; 48:10.
20. See Rāzī (2000: vol. 17, 152-153).
21. Additional examples are Q 6:19; 6:159; 10:20; 16:100; 20:98; 29:50; 46:23.
22. A similar example is Q 7:33; 16:115.
23. According to Rāzī (2000: vol. 5,10), *'innamā* may have two analyses: it may function as a restrictive particle, or the particle *'inna* is followed by the relative pronoun *mā*; hence Q 2:173 should be rendered “What he has forbidden you is carrion, blood, swine flesh, and whatever has had another (name) than Allah’s invoked upon it.”
24. See Ibn Kaḫfīr (undated: vol. 2, 279-280).
25. Another example is Q 21:45.
26. This explanation also applies to Q 2:168-169, where the Devil is mentioned. The two possible readings are (a) He commands you to do only evil acts and indecency and to impute to Allah what you don’t know (with the object as focus); (b) He only commands you to do evil acts and indecency and to impute to Allah what you don’t know (with the VP as focus).
27. Additional examples are Q 16:28; 64:12.
28. See Ibn Kaḫfīr (undated: vol. 1, 418-419).

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