Metaphorically Speaking: Embodied Conceptualization and Emotion Language in Tim O'Brien's The Things They Carried

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Abstract

Recent advances in the study of emotion in relation to cognition have heightened the need for scrutinizing the way emotion language interacts with cognitive processes such as metaphoric conceptualization. However, relatively few studies have paid attention to the interaction of emotion language with metaphors in a war narrative. We argue that (a) embodied conceptual metaphors merge with those events in O'Brien's narrative that generate anger, shame, and fear; (b) in the case of anger, the BODY AS CONTAINER metaphor is combined with HEAT in the form of PRESSURIZED CONTAINER; (c) the ontological and epistemic correspondences in the metaphoric mapping of shame reveal that the BODY AS CONTAINER metaphor governs the language about shame; (d) the SHAME AS A SOLID as an entailment of EMOTION AS BURDEN underlies the language of shame; (e) like anger, metaphors of fear are governed by patterns of force dynamics. The findings of this research can open new avenues for using autobiographical data in the study of emotion language.

Keywords: Conceptual metaphor, Embodiment, Image schema, War narrative, Tim O'Brien

1. Introduction

A generally held principle in generative linguistics posits that language is a unique faculty, a special innate mental module that is distinct from other general cognitive abilities. In contrast, as Barcelona and Valenzuela (2011) maintain, cognitive linguists believe that “our general cognitive abilities, like our kinesthetic abilities, our visual or sensorimotor skills, and our typically human categorization abilities jointly account, together with cultural, contextual and functional parameters, for the main design features of languages and for our ability to learn and use them” (p.19). This fundamental tenet of non-modularism is thus closely linked with embodiment which, according to Steen (2011), means that we make sense of our less directly graspable experiences, i.e. of our experience of time, emotions, or human interaction, on the basis of more directly comprehensible and more easily describable experiences, which are usually bodily experiences (p. 22).

The making sense of the abstract in terms of the concrete is achieved through imaginative mental mechanisms such as metaphor and metonymy. This explains the fact that the non-modularism view of language, i.e. the account of language as a product of general cognitive abilities, leads to ascribing a high level of importance to imagination (Steen, 2011, p. 22). Elsewhere, Steen (2001) emphasizes the importance of metaphor in cognitive linguistics and claims that far from being a kind of deviant rhetorical device limited to literature and comparable domains of discourse, “metaphor is fundamental, conceptual, conventional, and ubiquitous” (p. 146).

Although the original idea of the role playing of metaphor in abstract thought was for a long time around, it was given a systematic account by Lakoff and Johnson during the 1980s through what they proposed as Conceptual Metaphor Theory, henceforth CMT. Our agreement with Lakoff, Johnson, and others about the conceptual nature of metaphor rests on an important issue, viz. that the embodied cognition should be reasonably linked to such conceptual structure. We argue that the off-line cognition (M. Wilson, 2002; 2008) is quite capable of drawing such a reasonable connection between the embodied cognition tradition and the theory proposed by Lakoff and Johnson on which we draw in this paper. As Narayanan (2013) notes, the bodily basis of off-line cognition is illustrated well in CMT developed by Lakoff and Johnson, who maintain that abstract concepts are understood metaphorically and that they have their basis in various bodily experiences.
Clearly, embodied cognition provides for the backbone of many influential frameworks in cognitive linguistics, such as CMT, which stands out and above the various cognitive linguistic theories that form the embodied approach to cognition since, in Gibbs's (2011) words, it outlines “close linkages between bodily experience, entrenched patterns of thought, and language” (p. 579).

As Wierzbicka (1999, p. 30) has emphasized, the linguistic study of emotions should include not only lexicon but also grammar, phraseology, similes, and metaphors. Consequently, Tim O'Brien's (1990) Vietnam War memoir, *The Things They Carried*, has been selected as the focus of the present study in order to highlight the way conceptual metaphors underlie the experience of emotions such as shame, anger, and fear. The question that is particularly addressed in the present paper is whether the subjective experience of emotions overlaps with specific image schemas in the form of conceptual metaphors or not.

*The Things They Carried* is made up of many vignette-like narratives embedded within other narratives which seem to portray O'Brien's memories of the Vietnam War. While some critics evaluate this collection as an authentic recording of war experiences, it is not easy to understand since it includes many genres and styles: it is “about itself as much as it is about Vietnam”, “essentially a re-telling and re-narrating of stories that have already been told” (Middleton, 2008, pp. 69-71). This multiplicity of genres and styles in O'Brien's war narrative is considered by Vernon (2004) as narrative reconstruction of a sense of the self by a trauma survivor whose self-integrity had been threatened by trauma: he finds resemblances between this sort of self-disintegration or “the breakdown of the self's boundaries,” and the formal techniques used for “the blurring of fact and fiction and the blurring of genres” (p. 199) or, in Ringnalda's (1994) terms, “genre-straddling” (p. 101).

Kaufmann (2005) believes that O'Brien has moved away from “the comforting good form of modernism” toward the bad form of postmodernism in *The Things They Carried* (p. 335). Bourke (2006), on the other hand, highlights the significance of the specific features of the language used by the combatants and its evolving nature with the passage of time from the years of the World Wars to the Nam years and contends that one of the most interesting shifts in the language used by combatants was “the increasing employment of the disciplining languages of psychology” which was most powerful in the context of the combatants’ emotions: the frivolous swinging from panic to resignation and back again to panic (p. 28).

Slimak's (2007) study is cognitively informed as it involves cognitive mapping to account for O'Brien's manner of conveying the sense of “placelessness”. Slimak states that temporal and spatial movements are “disconnected and nonlinear, rapidly changing place and time from chapter to chapter, often even within chapters” (p. 20). Slimak contrasts the complexity and indefiniteness of cognitive maps in the Vietnam chapters with the detailed and organized cognitive maps describing the America experience of Tim-the-narrator (p. 23).

As can be seen, the way the emotion language of narrative interacts with conceptual metaphors has been considerably neglected. We believe that developing a cognitively-informed discourse for the analysis of traumatically-driven episodes would offer an understanding of the way these episodes are comprehended by the readers. As Freeman (2000) claims, in a theory of literature that is rooted in cognitive linguistic grounds, “literary texts are the products of cognizing minds and their interpretations the products of other cognizing minds in the context of the physical and socio-cultural worlds in which they have been created and are read” (p. 254). Accordingly, this research attempts to demonstrate the way emotion language interacts with metaphorical conceptualization.

The paper is organized as follows: as the backbone to our argument, the consequences of embodied cognition for CMT and image schema theory will be articulated in the next section. Following that, an account of the methodology will be presented. Finally, we will analyze the way O'Brien's text reveals the overlapping of some principal conceptual metaphors and related image schemas with the experience of anger, shame, and fear.

2. Literature review

2.1 Embodied cognition

In what follows we first remind the reader of a couple of basic insights from cognitive linguistics and cognitive science, namely metaphoric dimension of human thought and the embodiment of cognition. The basic ideas presented in the initial part of the following discussions will act as a reliable mold for highlighting a major image schema, i.e. the CONTAINER.

The embodied cognition tradition is a controversial, complex, and far-reaching enterprise that spans such disciplines as psychology, cognitive science, robotics, and philosophy, to name only a few. As a core assumption in cognitive linguistics and hence cognitive poetics, it is founded on the idea that large areas of language are motivated by the facts of physical, cognitive, and social embodiment, and that cognition extends beyond the traditional boundaries of skin and skull, encompassing artifacts and features in the environment (Hotton & Yoshimi, 2011, p. 444).

Gibbs et al. (2004) have shown that “pervasive patterns of bodily action give rise to metaphorical thought and language” (p. 1191). Also, K. Vecses (2010) suggests that our “subjective, felt experiences” of our bodies in motion make our emotion concepts grounded, or, embodied (p. 118). Verbal metaphors reflect underlying conceptual mappings in which we metaphorically conceptualize abstract domains of knowledge in terms of concrete knowledge (Tendahl & Gibbs, 2008, p. 1825). N. L. Wilson and Gibbs (2007) state that it is reasonable to talk about abstract entities like concepts, ideas, pride, and arguments in terms of bodily actions like grasping, chewing, pushing, swallowing, and so on. For example, they add, we conceive of ideas as physical entities that we can grasp, juggle, hold on to, chew, swallow,
These conceptual metaphors are manifest even in our subjective conceptions of different emotions. As we mentioned earlier, many conventional conceptual metaphors are constructed in terms of basic image schemas. One property of the CONTAINER schema which is persistently used in our conceptions of everyday experiences is the CONTAINER schema which is fundamentally important in metaphorical structuring and in inferential reasoning (Dewell, 2005). As D. C. Freeman (1995) states, we abstract from our earliest bodily experiences the salient elements of the container, creating an image schema by which we organize our perceptions, and from which we project the elements and structure of the CONTAINER schema onto abstract target domains to create metaphors (p. 692). Lakoff and Johnson (1999; 1980) maintain that not only our bodies can be considered as containers but also we constantly orient our bodies with respect to containers - rooms, beds, buildings - and we also project abstract containers onto areas in space. Similarly, Vecseses (1990) points out that in general, the typical use of the preposition in is to locate certain objects within the (three-dimensional) boundaries of a container.

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As we mentioned earlier, many conventional conceptual metaphors are constructed in terms of basic image schemas. These conceptual metaphors are manifest even in our subjective conceptions of different emotions. Vecseses (2004) believes that container is a major metaphorical source domain for most emotions. According to him, in many cultures emotions are seen as occurrences inside the body. As such, this seems to be “a near-universal way of conceptualizing the body in relation to the emotions” (p. 37). Likewise, Schnall (2006) pinpoints the importance that can be attributed to metaphors as they are quite powerful in emotion language because “they have the potential to evoke vivid accounts that tap into actual physical experience, such as the experience of emotion” (p. 30).

3. Research method

As Heywood, Semino, and Short (2002) state, the process of distinguishing literal from metaphorical expressions is fundamental to any attempt to deduce conceptual metaphors from linguistic data. Steen notes that conceptual metaphor theory should be put on a firmer linguistic footing (1999, p. 58). Accordingly, any cognitive linguistic attempt to identify conceptual metaphors should present, in the first place, how we get from linguistic metaphor to conceptual metaphors (Steen, 1999, p. 58).

Because the emotions specified for the analysis in terms of metaphorical language include anger, shame, and fear, as an initial step in our analyses, we have gathered data on the basis of these expressions as well as semantically related words in their respective lexical fields (Verdonk & Weber, 1995; Ungerer & Schmid, 1996) such as annoyance, rage, irritation, fury in the lexical field of anger, embarrassment, disgrace, humiliation, and guilt in that of shame, terror, horror, anxiety, worry, and panic in the same field of fear.

Based on the MIP method proposed by Pragglejaz group (2007, p. 3), in the second step we have identification of metaphorical language in relation to the above mentioned lexical fields. While their method requires one-by-one analysis of each lexical unit (Steen et al., 2010), we have focused instead on particular emotion expressions and the elements in their immediate context for deciding about their metaphoricity. To avoid a tedious repetition of the steps in analyzing each emotion expression, we have gone through the procedures prior to the discussions. The original MIP includes the following:

1. Read the entire text-discourse to establish a general understanding of the meaning.
2. Determine the lexical units in the text-discourse.
3. (a) For each lexical unit in the text, establish its meaning in context: that is, how it applies to an entity, relation, or attribute in the situation evoked by the text (contextual meaning). Take into account what comes before and after the lexical unit.
   (b) For each lexical unit, determine if it has a more basic contemporary meaning in other contexts than the one in the given context.
In addition to expressive and descriptive emotion expressions, there are also figurative emotion-terms, i.e. metaphoric and metonymic expressions, which denote various aspects of emotion concepts, such as intensity, cause, and control. The metaphorical expressions are manifestations of conceptual metaphors whose source domains are usually physical or physiological. For instance, *burning with anger* is a linguistic example of the ANGER IS A HOT FLUID metaphor, or the physical image in *burning with love* is an instance of LOVE IS FIRE, and *to be on cloud nine* is an example of HAPPINESS IS UP, which has an imaginary location domain on the verticality axis. These examples indicate “the intensity aspect of the emotions concerned” (Vecsey et al., 2002, p. 137). In O'Brien's narrative, emotional overtones are sometimes depicted in a metaphorical manner. In the following sections we will analyze the relevant conceptual metaphors that underlie different emotions in *The Things They Carried*.

4.1 The emotion language and conceptual metaphors in *The Things They Carried*

A large body of research has shown that emotion terms and expressions are more than registers of physiological experience; they also have conceptual structure (Vecsey et al., 2002, p.133). In addition to expressive and descriptive emotion-terms, there are also figurative emotion-terms, i.e. metaphorical and metonymical expressions, which denote various aspects of emotion concepts, such as intensity, cause, and control. The metaphorical expressions are manifestations of conceptual metaphors whose source domains are usually physical or physiological. For instance, *burning with anger* is a linguistic example of the ANGER IS A HOT FLUID metaphor, or the physical image in *burning with love* is an instance of LOVE IS FIRE, and *to be on cloud nine* is an example of HAPPINESS IS UP, which has an imaginary location domain on the verticality axis. These examples indicate “the intensity aspect of the emotions concerned” (Vecsey et al., 2002, p. 137). In O'Brien's narrative, emotional overtones are sometimes depicted in a metaphorical manner. In the following sections we will analyze the relevant conceptual metaphors that underlie different emotions in *The Things They Carried*.

4.1.1 Metaphoric conceptualizations of Anger

It appears that a certain thread runs through O'Brien's episodes that have emotional insinuations. The schema of CONTAINER which Vecsey (1990) aptly calls an extended metaphor accounts for most of the emotionally loaded passages in O'Brien's text. Embedded understanding of emotions can be observed, for instance, in his description of anger in the following excerpt from the story “On the rainy river”: “I remember the rage in my stomach. Later it burned down to a smoldering self-pity, then to numbness” (p. 31).

The verb *burned down* and the adjective *smoldering* embrace the root analogy *EMOTION=HEAT* (Goatly, 1997, p. 60). In this regard, Lakoff and Vecsey (1987) offer a more precise account of the metaphorical conceptualization of anger. They maintain that the ANGER IS HEAT metaphor is based on the cultural model of the physiological effects of anger, according to which increased body heat is a major effect of anger. They add that there are two versions of this metaphor: one where the heat is applied to fluids, the other where it is applied to solids. When it is applied to fluids, we get: ANGER IS THE HEAT OF A FLUID IN A CONTAINER (p. 197).

The specific motivation for this consists of the heat, internal pressure, and agitation parts of the cultural model. When ANGER IS HEAT is applied to solids, we get the version ANGER IS FIRE, which is motivated by the heat and redness aspects of the cultural theory of physiological effects (Lakoff and Vecsey, 1987). Although the above quotation embraces the general metaphor ANGER IS HEAT, it is difficult to decide whether this metaphor is applied to solids or to liquids. Consequently, we suggest that another entailment, ANGER IS HEAT IN A CONTAINER is reinforced here.

Vecsey (1990) states that EMOTION IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER is similar to the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL metaphor which defines a beginning, middle, and ending point; in a similar manner, the former metaphor also defines an intensity scale for the emotions with two endpoints, i.e. a threshold and a limit. He calls this a special case of the general orientational metaphor called MORE IS UP. In the above quotation, the presence of temporal adverbs implies the cooling down of the burning inside the container or a gradual decrease in the intensity of rage. So, the process of burning down of the rage to smoldering self-pity and finally to senselessness implies the cooling down of a fluid on a heat-scale (Vecsey, 1990, p. 147).

On the other hand, the gradation observed in the passage reflects another pervasive aspect of our experience, i.e. SCALABILITY. The preposition ‘down’ is obviously reminiscent of verticality and provides the basis of the concept of AMOUNT (Johnson, 1987, p. 121). Its underlying relation with MORE IS UP indicates that like this metaphor it is based on, or is an instance of, the SCALE schema (Johnson, 1987). The tactile perception of heat in this sentence is a “qualitative aspect” of experience and the intensity gradation attributed to this experience is rooted in the SCALE schema (Johnson, 1987).

As we mentioned earlier, when ANGER IS HEAT is applied to fluids, the ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER metaphor is obtained. It embraces, moreover, heat, agitation, and internal pressure. In “The ghost soldiers”, the narrator tells the story of his getting infection due to the incompetence of a medic: “I'd lie there all fidgety and tight, then after a while I'd feel a swell of anger come on” (p. 114). The expression ‘swell’ that he uses for describing his anger accords with the SCALABILITY schema mentioned above. There is no implication of heat here; however, since anger is usually conceived of as heat, it is plausible to infer that the narrator has conceptualized anger as a fluid in a container, i.e. his own body, which is coming up with the increase of the heat, in line with two other entailments: WHEN THE INTENSITY OF ANGER INCREASES, THE FLUID RISES. Or, it could be said that the PRESSURIZED CONTAINER metaphor for anger (Vecsey, 2004, p. 83) merges with INTENSE ANGER PRODUCES PRESSURE ON THE CONTAINER' (Lakoff & Vecsey, 1987, p. 199).
On Lakoff and Kövecses's (1987) view, one kind of responsibility in the cultural model of anger comes from the model of retributive justice that is built into our concept of anger: the responsibility of seeking vengeance. This conceptualization of anger is therefore related to metaphorization of responsibilities as burdens, yielding ANGER IS A BURDEN (p. 209), which is joined with the BODY AS CONTAINER metaphor in the clause ‘it was down inside me like a rock’: For weeks it had been a vow—I’ll get him, I’ll get him—it was down inside me like a rock (p. 119).

There are also very general metaphors that apply to anger and are commonly used in comprehending and speaking about anger. One of them has to do with existence, which is commonly understood in terms of physical presence; hence we will have existence is presence (Lakoff & Kövecses, 1987, p. 210) particularly in the clause ‘I’d lost’: “I’d lost some of the outrage and passion, but the need for revenge kept eating at me” (p. 120).

The need for revenge, which quite obviously corresponds with the responsibility of retribution, is conceptualized in the second clause as continuing to eating at him, implying anger as having an insatiable appetite. In Lakoff and Kövecses's terms (1987), this “appetite” seems to correspond to the “demands” in the ANGER IS AN OPPONENT metaphor (p. 208). It should be noted that as Kövecses (1990) has pointed out, the notion of retributive justice reflects general cultural values. As such, these conceptual structures can be traced to be culturally embedded as well, not just mental structures. Overall, the various metaphors O'Brien uses to conceptualize anger converge at certain points and yield a coherent system of conceptualization of anger. The negative valence of this emotion has given rise to negative conceptualizations: it is metaphorized as burning, burden, and glutinous.

4.1.2 Metaphoric conceptualizations of Shame

Ferguson et al. (2007) maintain that the threat of the person being held responsible for an unwanted identity is the shame’s central elicitor (p. 332). Shame is directly about the self which is the immediate focus of the evaluation. Shame emotion is accompanied by a sense of worthlessness and powerlessness or of “being small” and it has been often considered as more painful and “destructive” than guilt (Cavalera & Pepe, 2014, p. 458; Carné et al., 2013, p. 333). Tissari (2011), on the other hand, notes that “shame is nested in an intricate network of related concepts such as other NEGATIVE EMOTIONS, MISFORTUNES, PERSONAL AND MORAL CHARACTERISTICS, and RELIGIOUS REPENTANCE” (p. 294). On Tissari's (2011) view, what makes shame especially interesting is the connection between the physiological experience of shame, on the one hand, and the “cultural load” it carries, on the other (p. 294). This is what we observe in those episodes where the agent takes the burden of blame on his own shoulders, like in the following quotation:

[Lieutenant Cross] felt shame. He hated himself. He had loved Martha more than his men, and as a consequence Lavender was now dead, and this was something he would have to carry like a stone in his stomach for the rest of the war. (p. 18)

The BODY AS CONTAINER metaphor acts as a super-ordinate category to enlist body organs as containers, too. While Kövecses (1990) refers to the stomach as a location for fear in his recounting of metonymies for fear especially in the physiological effect NERVOUSNESS IN THE STOMACH (p. 72), here the shame associated with the responsibility Jimmy Cross feels for Lavender's death is situated in the stomach. At the same time, while the heaviness of stone is mapped onto the burden of shame, the stomach plays the role of a container in which shame is carried. Further, a typical conceptual metaphor, EMOTION IS A BURDEN, which characterizes shame, can also be observed here (Kövecses, 2004; 2010).

In another story “Love” Cross again mentions the unending burden by telling the narrator that “he had never forgiven himself for Lavender's death”, that “it was something that would never go away” (p. 24). The same metaphor is further reinforced in the following passage-with a modification of stone as “that new hardness in his stomach”: “He was realistic about it. There was that new hardness in his stomach. He loved her but he hated her. No more fantasies, he told himself!” (p. 22).

In the same context the narrator's conceptualization of shame can be found in his description of the burdens his squad members are carrying:

They carried all the emotional baggage of men who might die. Grief, terror, love, longing—these were intangibles, but the intangibles had their own mass and specific gravity, they had tangible weight.

They carried shameful memories. They carried the common secret of cowardice barely restrained, the instinct to run or freeze or hide, and in many respects this was the heaviest burden of all, for it could never be put down, it required perfect balance and perfect posture. (p. 21)

The gravity, mass and tangible weight are mapped onto the burden quality of these emotions. The ‘shameful memories’ can be linked to SHAME IS A BURDEN which is extended in a large portion of the second sentence as ‘the heaviest burden of all’, that ‘could never be put down’, that ‘required perfect balance and perfect posture’. In a related vein, ‘perfect balance’ and ‘perfect posture’ stand, metonymically, for ‘justified pride’ in Kövecses's terms (1990, p. 91).

As cowardice and its entailed emotion in a war context, shame, which is metonymically referred to as “the soldiers' greatest fear”, that is, “the fear of blushing” (p. 21), cannot coexist with pride, it is obvious that the person either bows under the burden of the shame or keeps his posture erect to retain his pride. Elsewhere, Kövecses (2004) has pointed out that the conceptualizations of “unbalanced forms of pride” contrast with those of shame, i.e. UP/HIGH and BIG
contrast with DECREASE IN SIZE (p. 33). Irrespective of his differentiations between justified or unjustified pride, based on O'Brien's text it seems that conceptualization of shame is somehow opposite to that of pride.

After enumerating various emotions including grief, terror, love, longing, along with shame, the narrator says: “By and large they carried these things inside, maintaining the masks of composure” (p. 21). In the first section of the sentence, the narrator has used the super-ordinate metaphor of BODY AS A CONTAINER FOR THE EMOTIONS (Kövecses, 1990, p. 92) to account for carrying all these emotions within the body.

To account for the relationship between the BODY AS CONTAINER metaphor and MIND AS CONTAINER metaphor, Kövecses draws, quite interestingly, on Talmy's (1988) notions of “agonist” and “antagonist” (p. 53). On Kövecses's view, Talmy characterizes the emotion container as central and the idea container, i.e. the mind, as a peripheral part of the self. In Talmy's system, he notes, the agonist-antagonist opposition is a metaphoric projection onto a unitary self of the “self versus the external world” opposition. Then he points out that in our folk model of the self the emotions are the deepest part of the self, thoughts being less deep, and actions as the most outward manifestations of the self. With this “onion peel” theory of personhood, therefore, “it is natural for us to conceive of the emotional self as central and the thinking part of the self as peripheral” (Kövecses, 1990, p. 152). Overall, as can be observed in the single sentence quoted above, TWO CONTAINER metaphors are combined to reconcile the inward emotions with the outward composure. Furthermore, the two metaphors involve the basic image schemas of CENTER and PERIPHERY. Since shame has been conceptualized as the combination of these two image schemas, it seems to have a “radial structure” (Lakoff, 1987).

Wierzbicka (1999) notes that a necessary cognitive component of shame in its older meaning is that there is something bad about us that other people know. As the trailing constituent ‘maintaining the masks of composure’ suggests, concern with one's image (‘I don't want people to think about me like this’) comes to the fore. In other words, the culturally salient concern of self-presentation and devoid of any references to “good” or “bad” and focused on the idea of self-control plays the crucial role here (p. 114). Put in another way, the soldiers are more concerned with what the others would think about them if they knew about the soldiers' cowardice. As the narrator states in the opening story, “they were afraid of dying, but they were even more afraid to show it” (p. 20).

Moreover, in the above mentioned clause, emotion is regarded as an inanimate object on the ground that the occasion that is described concerns the “hiding or disguising” the emotion (Kövecses, 1990, p. 163). In other words, by hypostatizing of the emotion and hence divorcing the emotion from the self (Averill, 1990), the EMOTION IS AN INANIMATE OBJECT metaphor suggests that emotion is an entity that can be acted upon by the self (Kövecses, 1990, pp. 162-63). The expression ‘masks’, on the other hand, is closely related to the container metaphor precisely because it corresponds to the image schematic BOUNDARY that is a crucial constituent of the CONTAINER metaphor. It lays bare, moreover, the possibility that emotion, as the truth deep within the private realm can be taken out and placed in the public, outer domain and that the individual can be treated “as the agent of his or her own emotional responses, rather than as a patient”. This is done according to the metaphor suggested by Averill, EMOTION IS A SOCIAL ROLE (1990, p. 123).

Metaphorical conceptualization of shame can be claimed to have roots in the cultural background of the narrator. Cooper and Ross (1975) have observed that the American culture's view of what a prototypical member of American culture is like determines an orientation of concepts within our conceptual system (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). The Metaphorical conceptualizations of Fear

In the context of one of the quotations analyzed above we observed that ‘cowardice’ or ‘the instinct to run or freeze or hide’ (p. 21) was one of the elicitors of shame for the soldiers. ‘To run or hide’ metaphorically refers to fear according to BEHAVIORAL REACTIONS TO FEAR STAND FOR FEAR and, more specifically, RUNNING AWAY STANDS FOR FEAR (Kövecses, 2010, p. 108). Besides, some emotions are more associated with coldness rather than heat. As such, an emotion like fear is widely conceptualized in English as being cold. Hence we have the metonymy DROP IN BODY TEMPERATURE STANDS FOR FEAR (Kövecses, 2010, p. 108) and the FEAR IS COLD metaphor (Kövecses, 2010, p. 81) as the conceptual representations of physiological response to fear in the predicate ‘to freeze’. Likewise, in the following passage from “The ghost soldiers”, the narrator describes the cowardly new medic Jorgenson based on the FEAR IS COLD metaphor, as Jorgenson’s ‘scared-white face’ and ‘twitching lips’ and the way ‘it took him ten minutes to work up the nerve and crawl over to’ the narrator indicate:

Jorgenson was no Rat Kiley. He was green and incompetent and scared. So when I got shot the second time, in the butt, along the Song Tra Bong, it took the son of a bitch almost ten minutes to work up the nerve to crawl over to me […] I kept seeing Bobby Jorgenson's scared-white face. Those buggy eyes and the way his lips twitched. (p. 113)
Jorgenson’s explanation of his feelings is aligned with the same metaphoric axis as he explicitly refers to getting frozen up which he rephrases as his being ‘full of drugs’ and his feet being ‘filled with sand’:

I'm sorry. When you got hit, I kept telling myself to move, move, but I couldn't do it, like I was full of drugs or something […] botched it. Period. Got all frozen up, I guess. The noise and shooting and everything—my first firefight—I just couldn't handle it. It was like my legs were filled up with sand, they didn't work. (p. 119)

In the following excerpt from “Ambush”, fear is conceptualized as the emptying and the refilling of the head. It could be said that the generic metaphor of BODY AS A CONTAINER FOR THE EMOTIONS is the basis of this conceptualization:

I was terrified. There were no thoughts about killing. The grenade was to make him go away—just evaporate—and I leaned back and felt my head go empty and then felt it fill up again. (p. 80)

The same metaphor is found again in the expression ‘stare into the big black hole at the center of your own sorry soul’. The expression ‘block it out’ accords with PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL STATES ARE ENTITIES WITHIN A PERSON (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980).

I'd pulled enough night guard to know how the fear factor gets multiplied as you sit there hour after hour, nobody to talk to, nothing to do but stare into the big black hole at the center of your own sorry soul […] your mind starts to roam […] You try to block it out but you can't. (p. 122)

This metaphor is also indicated in the following passage in slipping out of your skin and molting. The expression ‘slipping out of your skin’ is similar to being beside oneself which signifies THE SUBJECT OF FEAR IS A DIVIDED SELF (Kövecses, 2004, p. 23): “I was there with him. Together we understood what terror was: you're not human anymore. You're a shadow. You slip out of your own skin, like molting” (p. 125).

The EMOTIONAL EFFECT IS PHYSICAL CONTACT metaphor is exemplified in the following quotations through the verbs ‘had’ and ‘bang in’, while PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL STATES ARE ENTITIES WITHIN A PERSON underlies the sentence your nerves would go (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 50). The verbs ‘had’ and ‘bang in’ are also indicative of FEAR IS AN OPPONENT IN A STRUGGLE (Kövecses, 2004, p. 23).

Jorgenson pointed out at the shot-up sandbag. "That was a nice touch," he said. "It almost had me-." (p. 129)

The blackness didn't change. So pretty soon you'd get jumpy. Your nerves would go. You'd start to worry about getting cut off from the rest of the unit—alone, you'd think—and then the real panic would bang in. (p. 131)

On the whole, similar to the case of anger, metaphorical conceptualizations of fear are also ruled by specific patterns of “force dynamics” that underlie our embodied understandings of abstract concepts, including emotions (Talmy 1988), with the emotion force being viewed as physical, embodied entity, i.e. as an “agonist”, acting against the human agent as the “antagonist” (Talmy, 2000, p. 13).

4.2 Epistemic and ontological correspondences in conceptual mapping of shame

In our attempt to highlight the fundamental embodied conceptual metaphors, we call attention to the implied difference that exists between anger and shame. While emotions like anger and pride are considered in conceptual system as fluids (Holland & Kipnis, 1994; Kövecses, 2004), shame is considered as a solid. For a clarification of the point we draw attention to ontological and epistemic correspondences involved in metaphorical constructions as defined by Kövecses (1990). By using Kövecses's (1990) suggested ontological and epistemic correspondences for anger as a model, we can schematize these correspondences between the solid content domain and the shame domain in the following manner:

Source: HEAVINESS OF SOLID CONTENT IN THE CONTAINER

Target: SHAME

4.2.1 Ontological Correspondences

- The container is the stomach.
- The heaviness of solid content is the shame.
- The heaviness scale is the shame scale, with end points zero and limit.
- Content heaviness is the felt heaviness of shame.
- The limit of the container's capacity to withstand content heaviness is the limit on the shame scale.
- Lightness of the solid content is absence of shame feeling.

4.2.2 Epistemic correspondences

Source: The effect of intense content heaviness is internal hardness, pressure, and agitation.

Target: The effect of intense shame feeling is feeling heaviness, internal pressure, and agitation in the stomach.

Source: When the solid content is weighed past a certain limit, pressure increases to the point at which the container cannot bear the weight.

Target: When shame increases past a certain limit, pressure increases to the point where the person cannot cope with it.
vecses’s (1990) model which has been used as the template. On the whole, such affinity is plausible since both emotions are cognitively conceptualized as material, i.e. either as fluid or as burden, within a container, which is either, generally speaking, the body, or more specifically, a body organ.

5. Conclusion

The overlapping of emotion and cognition is manifest in many cognitive processes, including language use. Our study constituted an attempt to find the meeting grounds between the embodied cognitive processes involved in conceptualization of emotions - such as anger, shame, and fear - and the language used for expressing the subjective experience of emotions. We could see that the conceptual metaphor body as container holds ground in conceptualizations of emotions like shame and anger.

Our suggested ontological and epistemic correspondences involved in the mapping between the shame domain and the solid content proved to be much similar to those offered by vecses for anger. Conceptualization of fear, on the other hand, involved force dynamic patterns in a manner similar to conceptualization of anger. There is still much to be done to approach the issue of emotion-cognition interaction. Obviously, there are certain basic image schemas or primary metaphors which govern the language we may encounter in a person’s record of emotional experiences such as those in a war memoir.

We believe that our findings open new alleys in turning to such linguistic data in investigating the emotion-cognition overlap. The formulation of a feasible approach that intends to clarify the interconnections between higher cognitive processes like language and subjective, embodied experiences like emotions calls for relying on various sources of linguistic data, such as autobiographical accounts, for finding the clues to the workings of mind under the impact of emotions.

While the issue may be further complicated due to the role played by culture, as vecses and his colleagues (2002) have suggested, merging the cognitive method with a social constructionist approach would be much helpful, as the strength of latter is that it is capable of showing how emotional meaning emerges in particular cultural contexts and pragmatic discourses and it attempts to capture the entire socio-cultural system of emotional meaning, in contrast to the meaning of particular emotion words and expressions (vecses et al., 2002). Overall, it can still be hypothesized that individual records of emotionally stimulating events would offer great opportunities to see the way our mind merges conceptualization with external experiences.

References


1. In the mentioned quotation the stomach is specified as the specific container for anger. As the primary emphasis of our study is on the metaphorical conceptualization of emotions rather than on the reasons for allocating specific body organs for emotions, the stomach as container with regard to anger is not treated in detail. It only suffices to remind the reader of a Japanese metaphor, HARA IS A CONTAINER FOR ANGER, pointed out by Kövecses (2004; 2010), according to which anger is conceptualized in the stomach/bowels area (hara).

2. It should be noted that we propound the view held by Glucksberg (2001), especially his notion of “dual reference”. As he maintains, metaphors can be regarded as implicit metaphors. In that sense, since the explicit likening of the burden of shame/guilt emotion to the heaviness of a stone to be carried in his stomach is reduced to “that new hardness in his stomach”, the former expression can be regarded an implicit metaphor, as they are contextually relevant. In any case, it could be regarded as a metaphor within simile, in Croft and Cruse’s terms (2004, p. 215).